1.28.2015

Formal Apologies

Plato posited the Forms, the immaterial ideas of which the things we encounter in our terrestrial existence are mere instances. It is because of Forms that we are able to acquire true knowledge, for true knowledge is knowledge of the Forms. As perfectly separate and immaterial, the Forms are that which we define when we seek to give definition. No sensible object can fulfill this role because all material things are changing and imperfect. Our knowledge of things cannot be like this, so our knowledge cannot, properly speaking, be of such things.

St. Thomas sees this argument as reliant upon a premise which is not, in fact, true. The premise is this:

Something has the same mode of being as actually existing and as an object of knowledge.

What does this premise imply, logically speaking? Only this, that as we know, so things are. The intellect abstracts the universal from the particular and the mathematical from the sensible, therefore there are actual separate and abstract forms of particular things and actually existing mathematical entities which are independent from sensible reality.

St. Thomas does not think that this is a justified inference. Yes, the intellect knows by abstraction, but it is not necessary that this reflect reality as it is, meaning as it is apart from knowing beings. The way we know things does not correspond to the way in which they exist. The intellect understands universals and mathematical objects apart from singular and sensible things, but the separateness, universality, and immateriality that constitute this knowledge are modes of our understanding. They are not the modes under which the objects of our knowledge actually exist.

This argument is predicated upon a different assumption than Plato's:

Everything that exists in something else exists there according to the mode of the recipient.

St. Thomas Aquinas, ora pro nobis.

1.14.2015

The Objection from Progress

A very common objection to the philosophical enterprise among contemporary critics is what I will tentatively call the Objection from Progress. The objection is that if philosophy were truly a science, then its history would at least partially resemble the history of other sciences, meaning that it would begin crudely as men were first exploring its existence and implications, and with the passage of time it would develop through breakthrough, discovery, paradigm shifts, etc. Now philosophy's history does not look like this at all, therefore it is not a science or even a source of meaningful knowledge.

But is this true? Before the revolution that is modern philosophy came about, beginning officially with Descartes, many philosophers did see philosophical history in a way similar to the way men view sciences like physics today.

The first philosopher to give a comprehensive history of the development of philosophy was Aristotle, who considered himself as progressing beyond what came before. His history of philosophy began with Thales, who posited water as the ultimate principle of all things. Then Anaximenes and Diogenes posited air as the more fundamental principle. Hippasus and Heraclitus thought fire to be the cause of all things. Following these, Empedocles said that all three were principles of being, along with earth, and that it is through the unification and separation of these four elements that the things of our world come to be. After Empedocles come the atomists Democritus and Leucippus. They thought that the world was composed of atoms, or indivisible bodies, and empty space (so as not to make the world one continuous whole being) and that these atoms were arranged differently according to shape and position, The last school before Plato is that of the Pythagoreans who offered number as the source of all things. There is a relation between the teachings of the Pythagoreans  and Plato inasmuch as number approaches formal causality, which Plato was the first to fully articulate.

This is a very rough introduction to the history of western philosophy given by Aristotle. Putting aside monists like Parmenides who denied coming-to-be altogether, there is one theme that runs through this crude, embryonic, underdeveloped beginning to philosophical speculation: until Plato it is all materialist.


1.13.2015

Two Motions in Change

Both the material and efficient cause relate the formal and final cause as potency relates to act. Material generation seeks to achieve some formal determination, which just means that it seeks to actually become something. The final cause stands at the end of a process began by the efficient cause, and is that for which the efficient cause acts.